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Abstract 
 
As the U.S. housing crisis worsened in 2007, and through 2008, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac) headed towards insolvency. At the same time, contractions in private 
securitization resulted in these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) purchasing 
nearly half of all new mortgages. In July, the government passed the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) to provide a more effective regulator and to address public 
uncertainty regarding whether the government would back the GSEs’ assets and liabilities. 
HERA provided Treasury and the newly formed Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
with the framework needed to stabilize the distressed firms, which by then collectively held 
or guaranteed over $5 trillion in mortgages and mortgage-related securities. On September 
6, the FHFA placed the GSEs into conservatorships and Treasury took steps to ensure their 
solvency. The steps taken by the government pursuant to HERA avoided the collapse of the 
GSEs and the concomitant collapse of the U.S. housing market, but did not address the longer-
term issues inherent in the GSEs’ structure, which remain unresolved as the firms remain in 
conservatorship. 
 
1 This case study is one of seven 2021 Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case studies that examine in 
detail the various elements of the government’s rescue of the GSEs: 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module A: The Conservatorships” by Daniel Thompson 
and Rosalind Z. Wiggins. 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module B: The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements (SPSPAs)” by Daniel Thompson.  
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module C: GSE Credit Facility” by Emily Vergara.  
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’s GSE MBS Purchase Program” by 
Michael Zanger-Tishler and Rosalind Z. Wiggins.  
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008” by Daniel Thompson. 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module F: The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset 
Purchase (LSAP) Program” by Daniel Thompson  and Adam Kulam. 
•  “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – Module Z: Overview” by Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Benjamin 
Henken, Adam Kulam, Daniel Thompson, and Andrew Metrick. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 Daniel Thompson - Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.  
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The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008: United States Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$14,681.5 billion in 2007 
$14,559.5 billion in 2008 
$14,628.0 billion in 2009 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU 
converted to USD) 
$47,976 in 2007 
$48,383 in 2008 
$47,100 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year 
senior debt)  





Size of banking system  
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007 
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008 
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in 2009 
Size of banking system as a 
percentage of GDP  
62.9% in 2007 
68.3% in 2008 
66.9% in 2009 
Size of banking system assets as a 
percentage of financial system 
assets  
29.0% in 2007 
30.5% in 2008 
30.3% in 2009 
5-bank concentration of banking 
system  
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007 
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008 
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
22% of total banking assets in 2007 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
19% of total banking assets in 2009 
Government ownership of banking 
system  
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
0% of banks owned by the state in 2009 
Existence of deposit insurance 100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 in 
2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2008 
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 in 
2009 











Note: This article addresses how HERA changed the government’s relationship with Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. It briefly mentions HERA provisions relating to the Federal Home Loan Banks, 
another GSE, but does not discuss HERA’s other functions. 
Background  
The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are large government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
public-private corporations specially chartered by Congress to enhance the liquidity of the 
U.S. secondary mortgage market and thereby promote access to mortgage credit, particularly 
among low- and moderate-income households and neighborhoods (FCIC 2011, 15). The GSEs 
pursue their mission by buying mortgages conforming to their underwriting standards, 
guaranteeing payment of the underlying mortgages and packaging the mortgages into 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) which they sell to investors (FCIC 2010, 15). They also 
purchase private-label MBS (PLMBS), which invest in nonconforming mortgages that they 
hold in their portfolios (FCIC 2010, 23). The GSEs fund their operations by issuing debt and 
they enjoy a robust market with their debt being widely held. 
The firms are publicly traded for-profit companies whose shares are favored by investors 
large and small. They are governed by their Boards of Directors and shareholders but enjoy 
numerous advantageous because of their hybrid structure.4 Although not direct components 
of the U.S. government, they were often assumed to have the backing of the government due 
to a number of factors including: their housing mission, their government charter, their 
favorable statutory treatment, and the $2.25 billion backup credit line that each had from 
the Treasury Department (CBO 2010; FCIC 2010, 16). Their debt issuances enjoy a favored 
status among investors, banks, and even the Federal Reserve, similar to debt issued directly 
by the government (Frame et al. 2015). This “implied government guarantee” of their debt 
and obligations has been very beneficial to the GSEs in a number of ways including a lower 
cost of funding in terms of interest paid on debt securities and premiums paid on guarantees 
of GSE MBS (FCIC 2010, 16; GAO 1996). 
GSE Regulation Before July 2008. Several prominent federal officials expressed concerns 
about the efficacy of GSE regulators at least a decade before the crisis (Bernanke 2012, 8). In 
2004, Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that the GSEs’ massive balance sheets, dominant 
role in secondary mortgage, regulatory exemptions, and lack of market discipline created 
systemic risk in the housing market (Greenspan 2004). During his tenure as Chairman, Ben 
 
4 The GSEs are publicly traded and privately owned and governed by their Boards of Directors and shareholders 
but enjoy numerous advantageous because of their hybrid structure. “These statutory benefits include (1) 
exemption from state and local taxes, (2) a line of credit with the U.S. Treasury up to $2.25 billion, (3) eligibility 
of their debt to serve as collateral for public deposits, (4) eligibility of their securities for Federal Reserve open-
market purchases, (5) eligibility for their corporate securities to be purchased without limit by federally 
regulated financial institutions, (6) assignment of mortgage-related securities they have issued or guaranteed 
to the second-lowest credit risk category at depository institutions, and (7) exemption from the registration 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission” (Jickling 2007). 
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Bernanke echoed Greenspan’s concerns, adding that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s low 
capital limits posed a risk for the housing market and the economy (Paulson 2010, Ch. 1; 
Bernanke 2015, Ch. 11).  
Prior to HERA, Congress had tried and failed to pass legislation to strengthen the GSEs’ 
regulators or create a stronger regulatory agency (Frame and White 2004, 89-93). From the 
passage of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Soundness and Safety Act in 19925 
until the passage of HERA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were regulated using a two-tiered 
system: the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), which operated as an independent agency within 
HUD (Frame and White 2004, 88-89).  
HUD monitored the GSEs’ commitment to the mission stated in their charter and was charged 
with determining whether the Enterprises had adequately supplied the secondary mortgage 
market with loans, particularly for lower-income families and underserved areas (Fishbein 
2003, 6-8). HUD, which reviewed new mortgage program proposals from the GSEs, was 
required to authorize the programs within 45 days of their submission (Fishbein 2003, 6). 
Under this supervisory process incoming requests were approved by default (unless proven 
to be unauthorized, not in the public interest, or high-risk) if not rejected by HUD within the 
45-day period (Fishbein 2003, 5). Due to its regulatory burden, HUD occasionally chose to 
not review new GSE programs, such as the GSEs’ decision to begin purchasing subprime 
mortgages for their portfolios (Fishbein 2003, 5).  
OFHEO regulated the safety and soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Frame and 
White 2004, 88). As part of its duties, OFHEO examined the GSEs’ financial health, established 
risk-based capital standards, and ensured the GSEs’ compliance with the capital standards 
(Frame and White 2004, 88). OFHEO used three capital standards to evaluate the GSEs: a 
risk-based standard, a minimum capital standard, and a critical capital standard (Frame and 
White 2004, 98). The risk-based standard was intended to consist of enough capital to cover 
the interest, credit default, and operational risks plus an additional 30% of capital surplus 
(Frame and White 2004, 98). The established minimum capital standard was 2.5% of assets 
on the balance sheet and 0.45% of off-balance-sheet assets (Frame and White 2004, 98). The 
critical capital standard was set to 0.25% of on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet assets 
(Frame and White 2004, 98). OFHEO could seek disciplinary action if the GSEs violated 
capital standards or the law, which the agency did following the discovery of accounting 
errors in the early 2000s, but the agency had no authority to change such standards (Frame 
and White 2004, 90-91, 98-100). 
OFHEO’s authority and decision to conduct an intervention depended on the GSEs’ ability to 
meet the three capital standards. Based on this capital assessment, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac fell into four categories of increasing risk: adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, 
significantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapitalized (Frame and White 2004, 99). 
OFHEO’s authority was prescribed by the standard of capitalization of the GSE: 
 
5 12 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq. 
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1. If a GSE met all three criteria, it was classified as “adequately capitalized” and 
required no further action.  
2. If the GSE could not meet the risk-based standard, it was considered 
“undercapitalized,” which required the GSE to submit a capital restoration plan to 
OFHEO and prohibited the GSE from distributing more capital in the short-term.  
3. If the GSE failed to meet both the risk-based and minimum capital standards, it was 
“significantly undercapitalized,” which carried the same restrictions as the 
undercapitalized classification, and additional growth restrictions.  
4. If the GSE met none of the three capital standards it was considered “critically 
undercapitalized,” which permitted OFHEO to place the GSE into conservatorship 
(Frame and White 2004, 99).  
Prior to HERA, however, conservatorship was not considered a viable option because OFHEO 
lacked a mechanism to finance a conservatorship and had no power to delegate losses 
between debtors and creditors (Frame et al. 2015, 18). In addition, OFHEO was not 
authorized to initiate a receivership6 (Frame et al. 2015, 5). 
When the mortgage market began to contract during the summer of 2007, OFHEO loosened 
their portfolio limit and lowered their capital surplus requirements to ensure that the GSEs 
continued to provide the market with liquidity (FCIC 2011, 310-12). OFHEO raised the GSEs’ 
investment portfolio cap from approximately $728 billion to $735 billion in September 2007 
and abolished the cap altogether in March 2008 (FCIC 2011, 312-313). It lowered the capital 
surplus requirement from 30% to 20% in March 2008 (and from 20% to 15% for Fannie Mae 
in June 2008), with an understanding that the GSEs would use these loosened restrictions to 
raise capital (FCIC 2011, 314-315). While Fannie Mae was able to raise $7.4 billion in capital 
in May, Freddie Mac failed to do so (FCIC 2011, 315).  
Despite OFHEO’s efforts to mitigate the GSEs’ losses, many critics considered it unable to 
handle the full extent of the crisis (FCIC 2011, 314-315). Ever since its inception in 1992, and 
increasing overtime as the firms grew, many observers believed that OFHEO’s structure and 
regulatory practices were inadequate to its assigned task (FCIC 2011, 314-315). The agency 
could not adjust the GSEs minimum capital requirements, as the 1992 statute mandated that 
they remain at 2.5% and 0.45% of on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet assets, 
respectively (Frame et al. 2015, 5). OFHEO required annual congressional appropriations to 
function, which subjected the regulator to political interests, particularly because Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac had substantial congressional lobbying teams (Frame et al. 2015, 5). 
In 2003, then Treasury Secretary John Snow testified before the House Financial Services 
Committee that there was “a general recognition that the supervisory system for the housing 
 
6 The key distinction between a conservatorship and a receivership is that the former process is intended to 
manage the entity through a reorganization or rehabilitation, preserving its assets, and the latter is intended 
to manage the wind-down or resolution of the entity (Jester et al. 2018, 7-8).  
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GSEs neither has the tools, nor the stature, to effectively deal with the current size, 
complexity, and importance of these enterprises” (Frame and White 2004, 89).  
Market Instability in 2007-08. When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to post billion-dollar 
loses at the end of 2007, it became more apparent to government officials that the firms’ 
decision to purchase (and to continue to purchase) risky loans could destabilize the GSEs 
and, by extension, the entire financial system (FCIC 2011, 309-312). Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s worsening health increased public concerns about whether the government would 
guarantee their assets (FCIC 2011, 314-316). In the words of Tim Geithner (then President 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York [FRBNY]), “just about everyone except their 
captured regulator [OFHEO] agreed [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] were woefully 
undercapitalized” (Geithner 2014, Ch. 5). Market concerns increased on July 7, 2008, when 
a Lehman Brothers analyst released a report speculating that Fannie and Freddie would not 
be able to raise the required capital in light of weak market conditions for their stock and the 
possible effect of a new accounting standard that would require the firms to bring their off-
balance sheet entities onto the balance sheet (Paulson 2010; Wingfield 2008). The GSEs’ 
common share prices dropped by more than 16% as a result (Lockhart 2008). 
In July 2008, at Fannie Mae’s and Treasury Secretary Paulson’s requests, the Federal Reserve 
Board invoked its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 
enabling the FRBNY to extend a provisional line of credit to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(FCIC 2011, 316-317; FRB 2008). This also allowed the Fed—in cooperation with the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—to conduct its own investigation into the GSEs for 
the first time (FCIC 2011, 317). The review revealed that the GSEs were more financially 
unstable than previously suspected and might soon become insolvent (FCIC 2011, 317). 
Treasury also hired a team from Morgan Stanley to review Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
business operations; their assessment corroborated the Fed and OCC’s conclusions (FCIC 
2011, 317).  
Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke, and OFHEO director James Lockhart increased their 
lobbying efforts for legislation to create a new regulator that could rescue the GSEs from 
insolvency, stabilize them, resolve their regulatory issues, and quell general uncertainty in 
the market (FCIC 2011, 316-317). On July 13, 2008, Secretary Paulson testified before 
Congress, requesting “GSE reform legislation . . . to have a strong independent regulator that 
will inject confidence into those institutions and into the markets” (Paulson 2008). Paulson 
stressed that the new regulator should have the financial capacity—with the backing of 
Treasury—to stabilize the GSEs (Paulson 2008). Offering an analogy to support his request, 
Paulson argued that Treasury required a “bazooka” that it could threaten to use to increase 
confidence in the stability of the agencies (FCIC 2011, 316-317).  
Program Description  
On July 30, 2008, the government passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA). 
Among other things, the bill merged OFHEO, the Federal Housing Finance Board, and HUD’s 
GSE Oversight Team into the newly created Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and 
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enabled the FHFA and its new director, James Lockhart, to exercise significantly increased 
authority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac7 (FHFA 2008, 15).  
Beginning in August 2008 and continuing during the first three months of the 
conservatorship, the FHFA absorbed employees from OFHEO, HUD, and the Federal Housing 
Finance Board (FHFB); the move interfered with FHFA’s ability to act as conservator (FHFA 
2008, 15). Under HERA, OFHEO and the FHFB had a year to wind down their operations and 
integrate into the FHFA (HUD’s non-GSE-related duties would remain operational) (FHFA 
2008, 15). However, the FHFA’s decision to enact a GSE conservatorship seems to have 
accelerated this process to less than three months; the FHFA absorbed all OFHEO and FHFB 
employees and operations by October 27, 2008 (FHFA 2008, 15). The FHFA later reported 
that overseeing the GSEs as conservator while simultaneously managing a major 
reorganization integrating new employees and operations had created “administrative and 
cultural challenges in merging information technologies and systems, financial and human 
resources functions, and operational differences” (FHFA 2009, 30). In effect, the FHFA was 
stressed with creating itself at the same time that it was charged with managing the GSEs 
and stabilizing the U.S. mortgage market. 
Enhanced Safety and Soundness Regulation 
Like OFHEO, the FHFA could restrict asset growth if it found a GSE to be undercapitalized 
(Frame and White 2004, 99; HUD 2008; HERA 2008). However, the FHFA could also adjust 
minimum and risk-based capital standards (Frame 2009, 10; HERA 2008, 111-12). The FHFA 
could use cease-and-desist authority and remove company officers (HUD 2008). It was also 
given power to review and approve the GSEs’ new products (previously the authority of 
HUD) (HERA 2008, §1121-23; HUD 2008). The FHFA no longer needed congressional 
approval for its budget, providing it increased latitude (Frame 2009, 10). 
Based on the severity of the GSEs’ undercapitalization, the FHFA could restrict their capital 
distributions, force them to change their leadership, or—in the most severe cases of 
undercapitalization—place them in a conservatorship or a receivership (HERA 2008, §1145; 
HUD 2008). After enacting a conservatorship, the FHFA could stabilize Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac by any means necessary and could access funds from the Treasury if needed 
(Jickling 2008, 2-3). The conservatorship provision in HERA was intended to be similar to 
the power of the FDIC over insolvent depository institutions, but unlike bank regulators, the 
FHFA did not need to resolve the insolvency at the lowest possible cost (Jickling 2008, 2). 
 
7 HERA also designated the FHFA director to serve as director of the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), which 
are a collection of 11 banks that lend to institutions, mainly commercial banks and thrifts, for purposes related 
to housing (FHFA 2008, 23-26; HERA 2008, Title II). The FHLBs experienced financial difficulties as the result 
of contractions in the housing markets, but not to the same severity as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FHFA 
2008, 3-6). HERA provided Treasury with the same emergency capability to stabilize the FHLBs that it allowed 
for the GSEs (HERA 2008, Title II; HUD 2008). Treasury never exercised its emergency authority related to the 
FHLBs (Frame et al. 2015, 17). 
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After passage of HERA, FHFA continued to use statutory capital requirements to analyze the 
health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which gave the impression that Fannie and Freddie 
were more financially sound than they actually were (FCIC 2011, 318). Secretary Paulson 
claims that this approach left the FHFA unable to access the capital needs of the market 
(Paulson 2010, Ch. 1). Bernanke concurred with Paulson, adding that Federal Reserve 
officials had warned the regulator that the GSEs’ capital limits were too low (Bernanke 2015, 
Ch. 11). During this time, the GSEs capital levels were less than 2% (FCIC 2011, 309). 
Consultation with the Federal Reserve 
HERA recognized the role that the Federal Reserve played in regulating banks and financial 
stability by requiring the FHFA director to “consult with the Fed chairman” regarding: 
The risks posed by the regulated entities to the financial system, prior to issuing any 
proposed or final regulations, orders, and guidelines with respect to the exercise of 
the additional authority provided in this Act regarding prudential management and 
operations standards, safe and sound operations of, and capital requirements and 
portfolio standards applicable to the regulated entities (HERA 2008, §1118). 
The director was also to consult with the Fed chairman regarding any decision to place a GSE 
(including a FHLB bank) into conservatorship or receivership and to periodically share 
information about with “capital, asset and liabilities, financial condition, and risk 
management practices” of the GSEs and any information relating to financial stability (HERA 
2008, §1118). This consultative relationship expired on December 31, 2009. 
Treasury Funding  
While the FHFA was the GSEs’ regulator, HERA enabled Treasury to serve as a potential 
financial stopgap for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac during a conservatorship (HUD 2008). 
Under Section 1117 of HERA: 
Treasury is authorized to purchase any obligations and other securities issued by the 
Corporation . . . , on such terms and conditions as the Secretary may determine and in 
such amounts as the Secretary may determine. Nothing in this subsection requires 
the Corporation to issue obligations or securities to the Secretary without mutual 
agreement between the Secretary and the Corporation. Nothing in this subsection 
permits or authorizes the Secretary, without the agreement of the Corporation, to 
engage in open market purchases of the common securities of the Corporation. 
Treasury could exercise its broad emergency powers once it determined that its actions were 
necessary to: 
1. provide stability to the financial markets;  
2. prevent disruptions in the availability of mortgage finance; and 
3. protect the taxpayer (HERA 2008; HUD 2008). 
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Once it made this “emergency determination” Treasury could inject the GSEs with capital by 
purchasing an unlimited amount of their securities or debt, provided, however, that such 
authority was exercised prior to December 31, 2009, as also provided in the HERA (HERA 
2008, §1117; Jickling 2008, 2-3).  
The December date represents a compromise of design—unlimited authority but limited as 
to time—which made the bill palatable to legislators who were thought unlikely to grant a 
total blank check without any limits (Jester et al. 2018, 3-5). While this compromise 
recognized that it was to be a temporary authority to address the emergency situation at 
hand, it also acknowledged that the true scope of what might be needed to stabilize the GSEs 
was unknown (Jester et al 2018, 9-10). Concurrent with the passage of HERA, the federal 
debt ceiling was also expanded by $800 billion to $10.6 trillion to accommodate any 
emergency financing (FCIC 2011, 317; Jester et al. 2018, 8-9). 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also subject to additional guidelines, most prominently 
conforming loan limits, which capped the maximum size of the loans that the GSEs could 
purchase from originators (Frame et al. 2015, 2-3; HERA 2008, §1124). HERA also 
established a new formula for calculating the GSEs’ conforming loan limit, which provided 
the conforming loan limit would not exceed $417,000 for single-family units, and could be 
adjusted annually based on housing prices (HERA 2008, §1124). The conforming loan limit 
could not be reduced; only increased (HERA 2008, §1124).  
The Rescue Plan 
On September 7, 2008, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac near insolvency and facing liquidity 
difficulties, Treasury and the FHFA (in consultation with the Fed, as required) announced a 
four-part rescue plan to stabilize the firms: (1) place the GSEs into conservatorships8; (2) 
enter into senior preferred stock agreements to guarantee the solvency of each GSE; (3) 
establish a secured credit facility with each GSE; and (4) purchase GSE MBS (FHFA 2008, 9-
11).  
Figure 1: Programs Developed Using HERA 
 
8 The FHFA took Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under separate conservatorships. We herein discuss the two 
conservatorships as one due to the similarities between the two structures. 
Name of intervention  Funding limit Time limit 
Conservatorships Not applicable.  Unlimited 
SPSPAs Initially, $200 billion aggregate. 
Potentially unlimited. 
Unlimited 
Credit Facility No limit stated. To expire December 31, 
2009 
396
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 1
 
 
Sources: HERA; Treasury 2008a; Treasury 2008b, Treasury 2008c, Jester et al. 2019. 
Conservatorship is “a statutory process designed to stabilize a troubled institution with the 
objective of returning the entities to normal business operations” (FHFA 2008a). The 
decision to place the enterprises into conservatorship was based on a finding that they could 
not independently “continue to operate safely and soundly and fulfill their critical public 
mission” (FHFA 2008a). As conservator, the FHFA had broad authority to operate the firms 
until they were stabilized and released form the conservatorships or put into receivership.  
The second and third components of the rescue plan permitted the Treasury to inject long-
term and short-term funding, respectively, into the GSEs to ensure that they remained 
solvent (Frame et al. 2015, 16-17). Pursuant to the senior preferred stock purchase 
agreements (SPSPAs), the Treasury received GSE preferred stock (paying a 10% dividend) 
and a warrant to acquire 79.9% of the firms’ common stock for a nominal price in return for 
providing draws to maintain a positive net worth for the GSEs9 (Frame et al. 2015, 16-17). 
The final part allowed Treasury to purchase GSE MBS, which would help sustain Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac in their key role as issuers (Frame et al. 2015 16-17).  
While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac faced different problems (e.g. Freddie Mac had a larger 
capital hole), the government decided to adopt the same approach to resolve both GSEs 
(Paulson 2010, Ch. 1). In defense of treating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the same, Paulson 
argued that the market saw them as the same, as the market believed both had the implicit 
guarantee of the U.S. government (Paulson 2010, Ch. 1).  
Outcomes 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to sustain significant losses until 2012, and often had 
to draw funds under the SPSPAs to meet its liquidity requirements including funding the 
dividend payments it made to Treasury (Frame et al. 2015, 17; Thompson 2021b). Prior to 
2012, Treasury invested $187.5 billion in draws pursuant to the SPSPA (Frame et al. 2015, 
16). It also purchased $225 billion GSE MBS (Frame et al. 2015, 17). The Fed invested an 
additional $1,270.4 billion: $134.5 billion in GSE debt and $1,135.9 billion of GSE MBS 
purchased (FHFA 2019).  
In August 2012, the SPSPAs were amended to require that, in lieu of dividend payments, the 
GSEs would pay all realized profits, after a stated capital buffer, to the Treasury (Thompson 
 
9 The “keepwell” structure of the SPSPAs enabled the GSEs to continue to draw funding from Treasury even 
after the December 31, 2009, deadline stated in the HERA (Jester et al. 2018). Generally, a keepwell 
agreement is a contractual relationship between a parent company and subsidiary in which the parent 
promises to maintain the subsidiary’s minimum regulatory capital (Jester et al. 2018). For details of this 




At the discretion of the Treasury 
Secretary. No limit stated. 
To expire December 31, 
2009  
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2021b, sec. “Program Description”).10 Beginning in 2012 and continuing through to the date 
of this case’s publication, the GSEs have posted annual profits. As of the fourth quarter of 
2018, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have paid a combined $292.3 billion to Treasury in 
dividends and have received $191.5 billion in draws (Frame et al. 2015, 17; Thompson 
2021b).  
II. Evaluation  
HERA provided the tools that the government needed to stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in 2008. By doing so, the two GSEs were able to continue to support the U.S. housing 
market by buying a substantial number of mortgages when private securitization had 
evaporated.  
Over the course of the conservatorship, GSE shareholders have filed several lawsuits 
challenging the government’s sweep of profits pursuant to the 2012 amendment of the 
SPPSA; lawsuits are still pending as of this case’s publication (Frame et al. 2015, 26; Hurley 
2020).  
Some critics have claimed that the continuing conservatorships have created uncertainty, 
causing lenders to tighten their underwriting standards (Frame et al. 2015, 27-28). There 
have been several proposals for reforming the GSEs by various constituencies, but no 
resolution has emerged (Frame et al. 2015, 30). As of the date of this memo, the firms 
continue to operate under conservatorship and the amended SPSPAs. 
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